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CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE WHILE DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE-CAUSATION-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
held that the driving under the influence violation must be the di-
rect cause of death and that causation must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Lenhart, 520 Pa. 189, 553 A.2d 909 (1989).
On November 19, 1983 at 2:00 a.m. on a two-lane highway in
South Fayette Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Wil-
liam Bateman was killed when his car collided with a vehicle
driven by defendant-appellant Ronald C. Lenhart.1 A blood sample
drawn at the hospital where Lenhart had been taken for treatment
of his injuries, disclosed a blood alcohol level of 0.21 percent.2 An
analysis of Mr. Bateman's blood disclosed that it contained no
alcohol.
The police officer who conducted the accident investigation had
little experience investigating head-on collisions and conducted his
investigation without the help of eyewitnesses and without consult-
ing an expert in the field of accident reconstruction.' Based upon
this investigation and the blood test, Lenhart was charged with
five motor vehicle offenses 5 including (1) homicide by vehicle,' (2)
reckless driving,7 (3) driving on the wrong side of the roadway,8 (4)
1. Commonwealth v. Lenhart, 520 Pa. 189, 553 A.2d 909, 910 (1989).




6. Id. Section 3732 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in
the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to
the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731
(relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of
homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the
cause of death.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
7. 553 A.2d at 910. Section 3714 provides that" any person who drives a vehicle with
careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving, a sum-
mary offense." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3714 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
8. 553 A.2d at 910. Section 3301 provides in relevant part that: "upon all roadways of
sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway . 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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driving under the influence (DUI);9 and (5) homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence.10
Through photographs and the testimony of the investigating of-
ficer, the Commonwealth established that "there [existed] no
skidmarks, that debris from the collision was scattered equally
across both lanes of [traffic], and that both vehicles came to rest in
their respective lanes, except that the rear of appellant's vehicle
overhung the center line by somewhat less than two feet."1 The
Commonwealth further established through witnesses that the ap-
pellant had consumed three to six beers at a restaurant and bar
during a two-hour period prior to the accident. 2
Lenhart demurrered at the close of the Commonwealth's case as
to all charges." The Honorable John O'Brien granted appellant's
demurrer as to the first three charges; specifically homicide by ve-
hicle, reckless driving, and driving on the wrong side of the road. 4
In granting Lenhart's demurrer, the trial Judge noted that the in-
vestigating officer's testimony revealing that debris was all over the
road and that "one could speculate as to what happened here, but
the standard here is beyond a reasonable doubt, and I am not so
sure that you can say that beyond a reasonable doubt that Defend-
9. 553 A.2d at 910. Sections 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4) are as follows:
Section 3731. Driving under the influence of alcohol. (a) Offense defined.- person
shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any vehi-
cle while
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapa-
ble of safe driving.
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is .10% or
greater.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
10. 553 A.2d at 910. Section 3735 provides in part:
(a) Offense defined. - Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another
person as the direct result of a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating sec-
tion 3731 is guilty of a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of
death and the sentencing court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of
imprisonment of not less than three years.
75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1989). (Emphasis in original).
11. Lenhart, 553 A.2d at 910.
12. Id.
13. Id at 910. More specifically, Lenhart demurrered to all five charges including
homicide by vehicle, reckless driving, driving on the wrong side of the roadway, DUI, and
homicide by vehicle while DUI. Id.
14. Id. In granting the demurrer the trial court described the Commonwealth's case as
"very weak" as to whether defendant had been driving on the wrong side of the road. The
trial judge dismissed the homicide by vehicle charge because it relied upon the driving on




ant's vehicle was on the wrong side of the road . . ." prior to im-
pact.15 With regard to the last two counts, DUI and homicide by
vehicle while DUI, the court took the demurrer under advisement
to consider the briefs of the parties."6
On August 28, 1984, the trial court found Lenhart guilty of the
remaining two counts and later sentenced him to serve the
mandatory minimum three years but not more than seven years for
the homicide by vehicle while DUI,1 7 and eleven and one-half to
twenty-three months for DUI, to be served concurrently. 8
On appeal the Superior Court affirmed the trial court judg-
ments.1 9 The Supreme Court granted Lenhart's petition for allow-
ance of appeal, but limited its review to the homicide by vehicle
while DUI conviction.0
In its opinion, the trial court attempted to explain the contradic-
tory findings of guilty on the DUI charge and the homicide by ve-
hicle while DUI while at the same time acquitting Lenhart on
count two relating to crossing the center line.2' The trial court rea-
soned that the acquittal was not "based on a finding that appel-
lant's car did not cross the center line, but rather a recognition
that all such instances of crossing the line do not constitute a vio-
lation of section 3301" (driving on the wrong side of the road-
way).2 2 The trial judge further reasoned, that, although there was
no direct evidence that appellant's car crossed the center line and
caused the accident, "there is no other reasonable explanation for
this tragic accident.
'2 3
The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether
the Commonwealth had sustained its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lenhart's driving under the influence caused
the victim's death, when there were no witnesses to the accident,
15. 553 A.2d at 911. Because the homicide by vehicle count relied upon whether de-
fendant had been driving on the wrong side of the road, the court dismissed that charge in
sustaining the demurrer. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1989). A person convicted pursu-
ant to this section must serve a mandatory minimum three years. See supra note 10 for the
relevant language.
18. Lenhart, 553 A.2d at 911. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
See supra note 9 for the relevant language.
19. Commonwealth v. Lenhart, 361 Pa. Super. 635, 517 A.2d 1365 (1985). The Supe-
rior Court affirmed the trial court decision without opinion.
20. 553 A.2d at 911.
21. 553 A.2d at 911. (citing slip opinion, 10/11/85, at 4 n.3)
22. Id.
23. Id. (Emphasis in original).
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and no identifying skidmarks or debris to indicate which car had
crossed the center line.24 The majority opinion,25 held that there
was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the appellant caused the accident, and that his conviction for
homicide by vehicle while DUI must be set aside.26
Writing for the majority, Justice Flaherty began his analysis by
examining the pertinent language of Section 373527 of the Pennsyl-
vania Motor Vehicle Code.28 Justice Flaherty emphasized that it is
clear that the DUI violation must be the cause of death, and that
causation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, to sustain a
conviction under the statute.29 Because the parties stipulated that
Mr. Bateman died of injuries suffered in the accident, the majority
focused its opinion on whether the defendant's drunk driving
caused the accident.3°
The Supreme Court referred to the trial court's opinion relating
to count three, driving on the wrong side of the roadway, in dis-
cussing the issue of whether the Lenhart vehicle crossed the center
line.3 1 The Supreme Court pointed out that "common forms of
proof, such as eyewitness testimony, skid marks, or accident recon-
struction expert testimony, were entirely absent in this case;"
therefore the trial judge correctly observed that one could specu-
late "as to what happened here, but the standard here is beyond a
reasonable doubt.
32
Justice Flaherty held that the same reasoning was applicable to
the offense of homicide by vehicle while DUI.3 3 The Justice further
stated that "it is not enough to conclude that appellant's intoxica-
24. 553 A.2d at 911.
25. Id. Justice Flaherty wrote the opinion for the majority in which Chief Justice Nix
and Justices McDermott, Zappalla, Papadakos and Stout joined. Justice Larsen filed the
only dissenting opinion. Id.
26. 553 A.2d at 910.
27. Section 3735 is entitled homicide by vehicle while driving under influence. See
supra, note 10 for the text of this section.
28. 553 A.2d at 911. See supra note 10 for the pertinent language of section 3735.
29. 553 A.2d at 911. Justice Flaherty cited Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370,
344 A.2d 877 (1975), which required that "in any criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth
has an unshifting burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime..."
344 A.2d at 879. However in regard to the proposition that the driving under the influence
must be the cause of death the Supreme Court provided no guiding authority. 553 A.2d at
911.
30. 553 A.2d at 911. After concluding that the DUI charge must be the cause of death,
the Supreme Court reduced its inquiry to a factual analysis.
31. Id. at 911-12.




must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain
the conviction." 4 The court concluded that the Commonwealth's
evidence failed to establish the necessary proof at trial to prove
that Lenhart caused the accident.3 5 The judgement relating to con-
viction for a violation of section 3735, homicide by vehicle while
DUI, was vacated and the case was remanded only for execution of
the sentence imposed under section 3731 for DUI.3
Justice Larsen, in his dissenting opinion, began as did Justice
Flaherty in the majority by citing section 3735(a) of the motor ve-
hicle code pertaining to homicide by vehicle while DUI,37 and
stated that the elements for this charge were proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and he would therefore affirm the lower court's
judgement3 8 Justice Larsen relied upon Commonwealth v. Miku-
lan39 in finding that there was no question that appellant was
properly convicted of violating section 3731 (DUI) by the lower
court. In Mikulan the Supreme Court held that "[i]t, is now virtu-
ally universally accepted that a person with a [blood alcohol per-
cent] of 0.10 should not be driving." °
Justice Larsen, in the only dissent, also opined that when a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is before the court, the
court must view all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in a
light most favorable to the verdict winner, and accept it as true, in
deciding whether the Commonwealth had proven it's case beyond a
reasonable doubt.4' The Justice further cited Commonwealth v.
Holzer,42 for the principle that a criminal conviction can stand on
34. Id. (Emphasis in original) Justice Flaherty submitted that the possibility existed
that a sober motorist could have dozed off at 2:00 a.m., lose control of his car, and cause an
accident. Id. at 912.
35. 553 A.2d at 912.
36. Id.
37. 553 A.2d at 912. See supra note 10 for the relevant language.
38. Id. at 912.
39. 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983). In Mikulan, the defendant was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, after he nearly collided with
a Trailways bus in Pittsburgh. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
charges on the ground that section 3731 was unconstitutionally vague. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that the legislature did not exceed the lati-
tude afforded under police powers, nor did it violate any principles of due process. Id.
40. 470 A.2d at 1341.
41. 553 A.2d at 912 (citing Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332
(1981)). In Pettus the appellant was convicted in the trial court of murder of the third
degree, conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. Justice Larsen, speaking for
the majority, affirmed the lower court. 424 A.2d at 1334.
42. 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101 (1978). In Holzer, the appellant was convicted in a jury
trial of first degree murder, robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison in the
1990
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the basis of circumstantial evidence. 3 In light of Mikulan and
Holzer, Justice Larsen concluded that the evidence, although cir-
cumstantial, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Com-
monwealth, was sufficient to convict Lenhart of homicide by vehi-
cle while DUI."
4
In an effort to place the court's decision in perspective, an exam-
ination of the history of section 3735 is helpful. The development
of Pennsylvania's existing drunk driving law, began when then
Governor Richard Thornburgh created the "Task Force on Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol and Other Controlled Sub-
stances."46 The task force was created by the Governor in response
to "shocking" drunk driving statistics46 and pressure from lobbying
groups such as MADD.47 The twenty-member task force divided
itself into four special committees: Legislation, Public Information
and Education, Enforcement, and Alcohol Highway Safety Pro-
grams. 48 As a result of the combined efforts of the committees, a
new comprehensive drunk driving bill was introduced in June
1982.41 After filtering through both state houses, the bill was en-
acted into law on December 15, 1982.50 The new drunk driving law,
trial of first degree murder, robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison in the
death of a sporting goods store clerk, who died as a result of his throat being cut. 389 A.2d
at 103-104.
43. 553 A.2d at 912.
44. Id. at 913.
45. Mancke, The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving Law: Last Call for the One-For-
The-Road Era, 87 DIcK. L. REV. 805 (1983).
46. Id. at 805, 809. According to the Governor's DUI Task Force Report, alcohol-re-
lated fatal accidents had increased one hundred and fifty-four percent between 1972 and
1981. Over a ten year period, 250,000 Americans died as a result of drunk driving accidents.
This figure represented an average of 25,000 deaths a year, or 68 a day, which was five times
the number of U.S. combat deaths in Vietnam. Id. at 805 n.1.
47. Id. at 809. MADD stands for Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Id. at 805 n.3.
48. Id. at 810.
The Task force consisted of four members of the Governor's Cabinet, four legislators,
three private citizens, two local police chiefs, two highway safety experts, two judges,
one county coroner, a psychiatrist and a chief probation officer. The legislation com-
mittee concentrated on strengthening the law and streamlining the judicial process.
The education committee focused on providing public information, implementing a
media campaign, and developing a statewide alcohol highway safety program. The
enforcement division strove to streamline arrest procedures and increase DUI train-
ing programs for law enforcement agencies. Finally, the prevention branch endeav-
ored to increase community awareness and citizen support.
Id. at 810 n.44 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 805. The new law took effect at 12:01 a.m. on January 14, 1983. "The bill's
supporters wanted the Governor to sign the bill at an earlier date so that it would take
effect in time for the 1982-83 holiday season and possibly reduce the number of alcohol-
840
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in addition to imposing stiffer penalties for first-time drunk driv-
ing offenders,51 also created a new crime: "Homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence."52 Similar to other sections of
the new law, section 3735 imposes stiff penalties by mandating
that a driver convicted under this section serve a minimum of
three years in prison, and pay up to a maximum fine of fifteen
thousand dollars. 3
The early court decisions dealt with, and conclusively settled,
the first constitutional issues surrounding the newly enacted stat-
ute. The first case challenging section 3735 was Commonwealth v.
Hernandez.4 In Hernandez,5 5 the Superior Court addressed two
principal attacks on section 3735 by the defendant: (1)the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory sentencing provisions and (2)the consti-
tutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of 48 hours im-
prisonment for convicted first-time offenders." Hernandez's first
related traffic deaths that normally occur during the Christmas-New Year holidays. Instead,
Thornburgh repeatedly stated that because of the importance of the new law, he did not
want to rush his staff's review of the proposed law." Id. n.4.
51. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3731(e)(1)(i) and 1532(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1989),
requiring convicted first-time offenders to pay a fine of $300 to $5,000, a license suspension
of at least one year and to serve at least 48 hours of incarceration.
52. Id. at 816. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1989). The prior law
contained only a general provision, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon Supp. 1989) See,
supra, note 6, which covered all forms of vehicular homicide. This section was retained in
the present law and still applies to all non-DUI related homicides. Id.
53. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
54. 339 Pa. Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985). Judge Wickersham delivered the opinion of
the Court. 488 A.2d at 295.
55. 488 A.2d at 295. Hernandez involved a head-on collision on Route 850 in Perry
County between Hernandez's car and one driven by Kathy Kenee. Id. The collision resulted
in Kennee's death at age twenty. Id. The prosecution produced evidence at trial which
showed that appellant was travelling in excess of the speed limit and had crossed the center
line into the victim's lane. Id. In addition, appellant's blood alcohol content was tested at
.26%. Id. Appellant was charged with involuntary manslaughter, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
section 2 504(a); homicide by vehicle, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3732; homicide by
vehicle while driving under the influence, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3735(a); driving
under the influence while impaired, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3731(a)(1); driving
under the influence-10%, 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. section 3731(a)(4); and operation of a
vehicle with suspended or revoked license, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 1543(a). Id. at
295-96.
The jury found appellant guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to the following terms
of imprisonment: three to seven years on the homicide by vehicle while driving under the
influence conviction; two and one-half to five years on the involuntary manslaughter convic-
tion; two and one-half to five years on the homicide by vehicle conviction; and one to two
years on the driving under the influence while impaired conviction. Id. at 296.
56. Id. at 297-302. The appellant, Hernandez, also challenged the constitutionality of
the new law involving the per se drunk at .10% rule of 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section
3731(a)(4). Id. at 300. This section makes it a crime to drive where the level of alcohol in a
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argument urged the Superior Court to declare the mandatory sen-
tencing provisions unconstitutional for five different but closely re-
lated reasons.5 Hernandez first argued that the legislature violated
the separation of powers doctrine by prescribing mandatory mini-
mum sentences"8 and that the sentencing of criminals is better left
for the judiciary, rather than the legislature. 9 The Hernandez
court struck down appellant's first argument, distinguishing be-
tween criminal rights which are "'procedural', over which the judi-
ciary has exclusive and express constitutional authority, and rights
which are 'substantive! over which the legislature has the power to
declare what acts arecrimes and to prescribe the punishment for
their commission."60 Thus it being the legislature's function to pre-
scribe criminal sanctions, the court held that it was within the leg-
islature's power to .establish mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment.6 1
person's blood is .10% or greater. Appellant argued that this section is unconstitutional for
several reasons: "no rational basis exists for applying the rule to all persons; the rule is
vague and uncertain because it fails to provide persons with reasonable notice of the con-
duct proscribed; and the rule derogates the Commonwealth's constitutionally mandated
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and is a conclusive presumption."Id. The court
stated that "lilt is now virtually universally accepted that a person with a [blood alcohol
percent] of 0.10 should not be driving." Id. at 301. The court struck down appellant's argu-
ment holding that the rule does nothing more than to "specify a quantum of evidence which
is legally sufficient to sustain proof of this element of the crime." Id.
Appellant next argued that section 3731(f) is unconstitutional as violative of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine because it forces the district justice to bind over trial cases for which
a prima facie case has not been made out. Id. Section 3731(f) provides in part that the
district justice "shall not reduce or modify the original charges." The court struck down
appellant's argument because under Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 141(d) and
143(a), the district justice has no right to change any of the charges. His job is merely to
determine whether a prima facie case exists. Id. at 302.
Appellant lastly argued the enhancement provision of section 3731(e) lengthening the
term of imprisonment for subsequent convictions is unconstitutional for violating due pro-
cess and constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law, because it applies to convictions
under laws in force prior to the effective date of the new drunk driving laws. Id. The court
summarily struck down appellant's last arguments. Id. at 303.
57. Id. at 296.
58. Id at 297.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court did agree with appellant's contention that in certain situations the
functions between branches may overlap; however the court believed that these aspects of
procedural and substantive rules must remain wholly apart from the control of the others.
Id.
61. Id. The court found no significant difference between the language used in sections
3731(e)(1) and 3735, of the Motor Vehicle Code, and the previously upheld mandatory sen-
tencing provisions in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section
9711 (sentences for murder) or 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2704 (sentence for assault by life
prisoner). Id.
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Secondly, Hernandez argued that the mandatory sentencing pro-
visions imposed cruel and unusual punishment in that "convicted
persons are automatically sentenced to prison terms for 'uninten-
tional' crimes."" Superior Court Judge Wickersham cited Gregg v.
Georgia"3 for the proposition that the legislature is the most accu-
rate reflection of the "evolving standards of decency"64 in the com-
munity and further stated that the "mandatory sentences are not
disproportionate to the gravity of the problems caused. '65 Thus
the "statutes do not impose a penalty so lout of proportion to the
crimes as to shock a balanced sense of justice."6
In response to the appellant's third argument that the
mandatory sentencing provisions violated due process for failing to
provide the individual an opportunity to be heard by not allowing
him to set forth any mitigating circumstances, the court dismissed
it finding that the mandatory minimum sentences allow for the
consideration of ameliorative factors in determining the precise
sentence between the minimum and maximum allowed under the
sentencing code.6 The court applied the rational basis test68 in
finding that the mandatory sentencing provisions "designed by the
legislature to protect human life and property, represent sound
public policy, are reasonably related to the ends sought to be ac-
complished, and are not unconstitutionally impermissible." 9 The
court also applied the rational basis test in disposing of the appel-
lant's fourth, but closely related, argument that the mandatory
sentencing guidelines violated the Equal Protection Clause because
they treat drunken drivers who kill and non-drivers who are drunk
62. Id.
63. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the death pen-
alty is not "cruel and unusual" with respect to the Eighth Amendment, at least where it is
imposed for murder.
64. 488 A.2d at 297-98. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S. Ct. at 2925.)
65. Id. at 298.
66. Id. The court noted that the legislature determined that the current standards of
decency are met by mandatory sentencing for convictions under the new drunk driving law.
Id. at 298.
67. Id. at 298. The court noted that the Eighth Amendment requirement for individu-
alized consideration of mitigating circumstances of the offender has not been extended to
noncapital offenses. Id. See Commonwealth v. Waters, 334 Pa. Super. 513, 483 A.2d 855
(1984).
68. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1938) first set forth the rational basis test. The Supreme Court held that "the existence of
facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed . . . unless it is of such a charac-
ter as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators." Id. at 152.
69. 488 A.2d at 298.
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but kill, differently by not subjecting the latter to a mandatory
sentence.70 The court held that the classification offered by the ap-
pellant was not a suspect classification.71 Instead the court found
the classification between drivers and non-drivers to be rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of highway safety.72
The Appellant's last argument in Hernandez, with respect to
mandatory sentencing, was that mandatory sentence provisions are
unconstitutional because they place excessive and unreviewable
discretion in the hands of the prosecutor who may elect not to pro-
ceed against a certain defendant, if he or she does not wish to see
that person subjected to the mandatory provisions. 73 The court re-
jected appellant's contention finding that prosecutorial discretion,
in light of the abolition of the grand jury, is not unconstitutional.74
Later that same year in Commonwealth v. Cieri,75 the Superior
Court, citing Hernandez, rejected identical arguments by Cieri re-
garding the constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing provi-
sions of section 3735.70 Speaking for the court, Judge Spaeth af-
firmed the lower court's determination finding the appellant's
arguments to be without merit."
Other challenges to the sentencing provisions on constitutional
grounds have also been unsuccessful. In Commonwealth v. Kun-
70. Id. at 298-99. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that ". . . Nor shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, section 1.
71. 488 A.2d at 299. In order to fall within a suspect classification, a statutory classifi-
cation which does not implicate a fundamental interest, must not be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 (1984).
72. 488 A.2d at 299.
73. Id.
74. Id. In so holding the Superior court agreed with the trial court which stated that
"[a] person charged is either guilty or not guilty. The risk that someone will be charged who
should not be charged is not of serious concern because of the safeguard of the trial." Id.
(citing Lower ct. op. at 4).
75. 346 Pa. Super. 77, 499 A.2d 317 (1985). In Cieri, Thomas Cieri was convicted of
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance,
involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, and driving under the influence. The
facts at trial showed that shortly after midnight, Cieri, while driving his car with his brother
as a passenger, slammed head on into a car driven by Gary McMillan. Katherine Waldron,
McMillan's passenger, died as a result of injuries suffered in the collision. 499 A.2d at 319-
320.
76. 499 A.2d at 326.
77. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Kostra, 349 Pa. Super. 89, 502 A.2d 1287 (1985)




selman,78 the appellee in the trial court had plead guilty to charges
of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, involun-
tary manslaughter, recklessly endangering another person, homi-
cide by vehicle, and other related charges. 79 The trial judge sen-
tenced the appellant to one and one-half to three years
imprisonment to ensure that appellant could serve his sentence in
Erie County.8 The Commonwealth appealed arguing that the
lower court erred in failing to follow the mandatory sentencing
provisions of section 3735.81 The Superior Court, per Judge
Tamilia, agreed with the Commonwealth's contention interpreting
the phrase "minimum term of imprisonment of not less than three
years," ' 2 to require just that; a minimum sentence of three years,
not a maximum sentence as the trial court suggested. s3 The Supe-
rior Court opined that "for the court to impose a minimum and a
maximum sentence in violation of the law and then to hold that
the parole board is required to obey the law and hold the defend-
ant for the maximum term, frustrates the intent of the mandatory
sentence law."8 4
Commonwealth v. Dungan 5 involved an appeal from the imposi-
tion of multiple sentences for multipl deaths arising from a single
accident. The appellant, Dungan, was charged when two persons in
the van he was driving, and three persons in one of the vehicles he
struck, were killed.86 Dungan was convicted by a jury on five
counts of homicide by vehicle and five counts of homicide by vehi-
cle while driving under the influence and two counts of driving
under the influence of alcohol.8 7 Thereafter appellant was sen-
tenced to serve three consecutive jail terms of three to six years,
two concurrent jail terms of three to six years and to pay the costs
78. 363 Pa. Super. 475, 526 A.2d 443 (1987).
79. 526 A.2d at 443.
80. Id. Originally, the trial judge had sentenced Kunselman to three to six years for
the homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence charge, with the sentences for the
other crimes to run concurrently with the three to six year sentence. He subsequently modi-
fied the sentence notifying the prosecution of the change by letter. Id.
The trial judge believed the sentence to be in accord with the mandatory guidelines be-
cause the Parole Board simply could not release the defendant until he had served his entire
three years. He merely assumed that the Parole Board would comply with the law. Id. at
444 (citing slip op., Nygaard, J. 4/1/86).
81. Id. at 443.
82. See supra note 10, for the relevant language of 3735.
83. 526 A.2d at 444.
84. Id. at 446.
85. 372 Pa. Super. 323, 539 A.2d 817, (1988).
86. 539 A.2d at 818.
87. Id. at 819.
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of prosecution."' Dungan argued on appeal that it was unlawful for
a court to impose multiple sentences for multiple deaths resulting
from a single accident8 9
The Superior Court began its analysis by noting that where it
was legislatively authorized, it was legal for a court to impose mul-
tiple sentences upon a defendant whose single unlawful act injures
multiple victims.90 The Dungan court found the language of sec-
tion 3735 identical to the language of section 3732, homicide by
vehicle." Finding the language identical to section 3732 and apply-
ing the test set forth in the case of Commonwealth v. Frisbie,92
Judge Tamilia found I the multiple sentences for the multiple
deaths caused by one single accident to be legislatively
authorized.
9 3
The Superior Court has also rejected other challenges to section
3735, including the argument that an element of the offense of
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence required a
prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.9 4 In
Commonwealth v. Johnson,95 the appellant was found guilty in a
bench trial of driving while under the influence of alcohol, simple
assault, and recklessly endangering another person.9 6 In Common-
wealth v. Kelly,9 7 appellant was convicted by a jury of driving
under the influence of alcohol, homicide by vehicle, homicide by
vehicle while driving under th influence, and involuntary man-
88. Id. at 328.
89. Id. at 825.
90. Id. at 825. Here the court cited Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 485 A.2d
1098 (1984), where it was held that where the legislature intended to preclude multiple pun-
ishments for multiple injuries resulting from a single act, it has expressly done so. 485 A.2d
at 1100.
'91. Id. at 825. Section 3735 provides in part, "Any person who unintentionally causes
the death of another person..." The Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Zaengle, 345 Pa.
Super. 124, 497 A.2d 1335 (1985), concluded the legislature authorized multiple sentences
resulting from a single violation of section 3732.
92. 506 Pa. 461, 485 A.2d 1098 (1984).
93. 539 A.2d at 826.
94. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 376 Pa. Super. 121, 545 A.2d 349 (1988), and Com-
monwealth v. Kelly, 365 Pa. Super. 28, 528 A.2d 1346 (1987).
95. 376 Pa. Super. 121, 545 A.2d 349 (1988).
96. 545 A.2d at 351-352. The facts of the case showed that the appellant, while driving
a truck for his employer the Philadelphia Water Department, went through a red light and
struck a small red pickup truck. After the collision, appellant's truck continued to move,
whereupon it mounted a curb and struck a pedestrian, crushing her against a wall. A sample
of blood taken from the appellant after the accident revealed a blood alcohol content of
.15%: more than the amount needed to satisfy the section 3731 requirement of .10%. Id.
97. 365 Pa. Super. 28, 528 A.2d 1346 (1987).
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slaughter. 8 Both Kelly and Johnson argued on appeal that the lan-
guage of section 3735 requiresd a prior conviction of driving under
the influence. 9 The relevant language of section 3735 is "Any per-
son who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the
direct result of a violation of section 3731. . .and who is convicted
of violating section 3731 is guilty. .. "100 While the Johnson court
found the appellants' contention novel, both courts rejected the ar-
guments. The Johnson court stated that "strict construction of a
penal statute does not require that the words of the statute be
given their narrowest meaning." 10 1 To do so, the court suggested,
would be to require separate trials for each offense.10 2 The Johnson
court held that it was sufficient that charges of violating section
3731 and 3735 be submitted to the same factfinder. 10 3 The Kelly
court essentially followed the same reasoning the Johnson court
used in finding that the language of section 3735 was satisfied if
both counts were tried concurrently. 10' However the Kelly court,
following the trial court's opinion, went on to require that the trial
court must instruct the jury that they must first find the defendant
guilty of driving under the influence before addressing the issue of
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.1"5
The last issue relating to section 3735 of the motor vehicle code
addressed by the courts thus far is the issue of causation. The
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence statute on its
face requires that the DUI violation be the direct cause of death in
order to convict a defendant.0 ' Despite the seemingly clear lan-
guage of the statute, state appellate courts addressing the issue are
unclear as to what standard of causation is applicable.
Traditionally, Pennsylvania has not employed the proximate
98. 528 A.2d at 1347. On March 25, 1984, Morgan Kelly, while under the influence of
alcohol, lost control of his vehicle, crossed the center line of the road and struck the victim's
car, killing her and injuring her husband. A blood alcohol test administered to appellant
revealed a blood alcohol level of .24%. Id.
99. Johnson, 545 A.2d at 353, Kelly, 528 A.2d at 1348.
100. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). (emphasis added).
101. 545 A.2d at 354.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court noted that the statute only requires that there can be no conviction
under section 3735 unless there is also a conviction under section 3731. Id.
104. 528 A.2d at 1348-1349. (Agreeing with and citing the trial court opinion, Slip.
Op., Scarlata, J., 11/26/86, p. 6).
105. Id. at 1349.




cause test in criminal cases."0 7 The first appellate court to address
the issue of causation in relation to a section 3735 violation de-
cided to follow the reasoning of cases interpreting the causation
element of section 3732.108 In Commonwealth v. Dixon'0 9 the court
followed the rationale of the Superior court in Commonwealth v.
Field'" where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that under
section 3732 the Commonwealth must show that "at the very least,
death was a probable consequence of the conduct."'' The Dixon
court found the reasoning in Field persuasive and held that the
causation element in that case was satisfied by the fact that the
Commonwealth had demonstrated that the appellant knew or
should have known that he was violating the law prohibiting driv-
ing under the influence, that nevertheless he drove a car and could
forseeably have been involved in an accident involving death."2
The next appellate case interpreting the causation language of
section 3735 was Commonwealth v. Kostra.13 There the appellant
argued that he was not the legal cause of the decedent's death,
that instead the cause of death was the removal of life support
systems used to keep the decedent alive." 4 The Kostra Court be-
gan its analysis by noting that the Commonwealth must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that death occurred as a result of injuries
received in the incident or of a chain of events stemming from the
107. Mancke, Homicide by Vehicle in Pennsylvania: A Question of Meaning and
Constitutionality, 85 DICK. L. REV. 391 (1981). Pennsylvania has traditionally required di-
rect cause in vehicle cases as set forth in the Crimes Code. The Crimes code provides that
"conduct is the cause of a result when: it is the antecedent but for which the result in
question would not have occurred." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 303(a)(1) (Purdon Supp.
1989). In vehicle cases, a defendant's act in violating a traffic law is not the direct cause of
death unless the death would not have occurred but for that violation. Id.
108. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 346 Pa. Super. 36, 498 A.2d 1358 (1985).
109. 346 Pa. Super. 36, 498 A.2d 1358 (1985).
110. 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980)
111. 498 A.2d at 1361. The appellant in Dixon had argued that the section 3735 is void
for vagueness in failing to define the phrase "when the violation is the cause of death. Id.
The court, citing Commonwealth v. Burt, 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 89, (1980), in which the
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument with regard to 3732, rejected appellant's argu-
ment and found that the words of the section are not ambiguous. Id. at 1360.
112. Id. at 1361.
113. 349 Pa. Super. 78, 502 A.2d 1287 (1985). In Kostra, the appellant was convicted
of homicide by vehicle, driving while under the influence, homicide by vehicle while driving
under the influence, and driving at an unsafe speed. Kostra was charged with the aforemen-
tioned crimes when he lost control of his car injuring all his passengers, after spending the





incident.'15 The court held that "so long as the defendant's actions
are a direct and substantial factor in bringing about death, legal
responsibility may be found." 1 6 The court further held that "a de-
fendant cannot escape liability for homicide if his actions begin an
unbroken chain of causation which leads to his death. 11 7 Applying
that rationale the court found that Kostra was indeed the legal
cause of decedent's death in light of the fact that his drunken driv-
ing and eventual crash set in motion the chain of events leading to
the victim's demise.1 s
Commonwealth v. Lenhart 9 was the next appellate case, and
the first Supreme Court case, to examine the causation issue. Jus-
tice Flaherty, after examining the relevant language of section
3735, held that it "is clear that the DUI violation must be the
cause of death in order to sustain a conviction" under the stat-
ute.12 An examination of Kostra and Dixon in light of Lenhart is
helpful in determining what standard of causation one must prove
to establish a conviction under 3735. The language of section 3735
clearly requires that the DUI violation be the direct cause of
death.' 2' The Dixon Court interpreted this language to require
that death be "a probable consequence of the conduct," with the
DUI violation being the conduct in question.122 The Kostra court
held that the defendant's actions (the DUI violation) are the legal
cause of death if they start an unbroken chain of causation which
leads to death.12 3 Reading all three cases together, in light of the
statutory language, it seems clear that the DUI violation is a direct
and substantial factor in bringing about decedent's death if the vi-
olation starts an unbroken chain of events and death was a proba-
ble consequence of those events. With this reading in mind, the
Supreme Court in Lenhart was justified in vacating the homicide
by vehicle, while DUI conviction in favor of the appellant, Len-
hart.124 The Commonwealth failed to prove through accident re-
construction or other forms of proof that Lenhart's DUI violation




119. 553 A.2d 909 (1989).
120. Id. at 911. See supra note 26.
121. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1989) See supra note 10 for the
relevant language.
122. 498 A.2d at 1361.
123. 502 A.2d at 1289.
124. 553 A.2d at 912.
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started an unbroken chain of events causing the collision which re-
sulted in Bateman's death. 12 5 Despite the lack of direct proof on
causation, the trial court found that there was no other reasonable
explanation for the accident, a clearly insufficient finding under a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
1 26
By merely reiterating the statutory language of section 3735 in
Lenhart the Supreme Court failed to provide the lower courts with
a guide in interpreting the causation language. However, a synthe-
sis of the Lenhart, Kostra and Dixon cases in light of the statutory
language does set forth a clear standard for the courts to use in
future cases.
Christopher T. Lee
125. Id. at 911.
126. Id.
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